The announcement was made in a public message to President John F Kennedy broadcast on Moscow Radio.

The 'gravest issues' were at hand.

... one harrowing moment followed another.

Kennedy publicly agreed to the first request and secretly agreed to the second.
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Kennedy by Hugh Brogan (Longman, 1996)

A hot line between the USA and USSR was set up to prevent such a crisis happening again.
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis by Ernest May, Philip Zelikow, Ernest R. May (Editor), Philip D. Zelikow (Editor) (W.W. Norton, 2002)


EHRM 12 januari 2016, 37138/14, Szabó and Vissy/Hungary, §68.

Because Khrushchev had been faced down, he did not force a new Berlin crisis. The Soviet bloc lived for the next 27 years with a wall around West Berlin that marked East Germany as a huge penitentiary, and it eventually became possible for west and east to turn towards the stabilising compromises of the later period of détente.

In this light it is also interesting to mention that the Belgian Government is proposing further limits to the right to liberty when it comes to terrorist suspects. The conditions for provisional detention of terrorism suspects will become less stringent, as on 24 June 2016.

GwH, 14 Mei 2009, nr. 85/2009.

The world escaped nuclear war in October 1962 largely because of the prudence of Kennedy and the belated prudence of Khrushchev. Though Kennedy had felt it necessary to be uncompromising in his demand for removal of the missiles from Cuba, he had been careful to put off to the last possible moment any action that could result in killing a Russian. Khrushchev had probably decided to drop his demand for quid pro quo removals from Turkey as a result of learning that a Soviet anti-aircraft missile in Cuba had shot down a US U-2 plane, killing the pilot. Kennedy and Khrushchev both recognised that, once blood had been spilled, it would be very hard to keep any crisis under control.

GwH, 11 juni 2015, nr. 84/2015

In fact, the exchange between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin had no effect. Khrushchev had already decided to retreat to a simple request for a no invasion pledge. And the crisis ended on that basis. US reconnaissance aircraft kept watch while the Soviets dismantled their missiles and loaded the parts on ships for return to the Soviet Union.

Vanoost, L., Noodtoestand in Frankrijk, kan het in België ook?, .

In the end, Kennedy found a way to finesse the situation. He sent Robert Kennedy to see the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to tell him that the missiles in Turkey were obsolete, and that the US planned to pull them out within about six months. All this was true. He said further, however, that, if the Soviet Union used this knowledge to claim that the US had struck the deal proposed in Khrushchev's radio message, Kennedy would deny the claim and would not remove the missiles from Turkey. What Kennedy wanted was to mollify Khrushchev without seeming to make a concession, and above all to avoid any prolonged negotiations. He had to insist that Soviet missiles come out of Cuba unconditionally, or he would compromise the display of firmness that he judged necessary to protect against a Berlin crisis.

Source image: “Homeland Security Made Perfect”, at .

One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J Naftali, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1998)